Introduction 73
Post Normal Science (PNS) is a theoretical framework developed by Funtowicz and Ravetz 74 (1993) to denote a new way of production of science that is required in the context of high 75 scientific uncertainty and high stake (interest), when the problems are multifaceted and 76 decisions are urgent. Within this context, scientific process, traditionally confined to 77 scientific peer community, is seen to benefit from engagement with an extended peer 78 community that includes many perspectives and values. Arguably, scientific advisory 79 committees are the site within which PNS practice is most visible (Lorenzoni et al, 2007) due 80
to their boundary position between science and policy (Guston, 2001) . We report on a case 81 study of the Scientific Advisory Committee for Nutrition in its efforts to engage a wider 82 network of stakeholders in the processes of setting recommendations for salt. Uniquely, the 83 case study examines the actual consultation outputs throughout the recommendations 84 setting process. We apply the analytical framework developed by Turnpenny et al (2009) to 85 capture the elements of practice within SABs that can be described as "post-normal 86 science", and critically evaluate the application of the concept. The current article reflects 87 on the extent to which PNS is a helpful lens through which the processes of engagement 88 within SABs are explained and theorised. 89
The remainder of this introduction unfolds as follows: we will first give an overview 90 of PNS theoretical framework and the aligned notion of democratisation of science, then 91 review the policy origins of the calls for democratisation of science with a particular 92 reference to the workings of SABs. We will then describe the case of SACN reviewing both 93 the policy context and the institutional characteristics of the SACN.
identify the contexts -issues, stakes and uncertainties -that call for the extended peer 118 community in scientific practice (Turnpenny, Lorenzoni Jones, 2009 ). The studies employing 119 PNS as a framework have used it to identify the "wicked" problems -issues characterised by 120 uncertainty, value inconsistency, urgency and heterogeneity of visions and epistemologies -121 that call for the adoption of post normal scientific practice (e.g. Saloranta, 2001 ); and to 122 explain the processes of science in practice in the light of PNS (e.g. Turnpenny Lorenzoni and 123 Jones, 2009; Petersen et al, 2011) . Among the more enduring debates about PNS is the 124 extent to which it represents a normative framework for scientific practice and its links to 125 policy, or rather, is a theoretical model, a description or a heuristic (Farrell, 2011 ) that offers 126 an explanatory framework for this interaction as it happens in practice. The growing critique 127 of PNS framework questions some of its unexamined assumptions that ascribe a normative 128 role to the extended peer community as "quality control" (Wesselink and Hoppe, 2011) . characterised by consensus and uniformity. It is argued that the current procedure for 136 linking democratic control and risk assessment as the two modalities of decision-making 137 within a SAB can lead to institutional deficiency and diminished legitimacy (Ferretti, 2007 , 138 Bijker et al., 2009 ). This raises an issue of the applicability of PNS aims in practice, their 139 compatibility with the traditional governance approaches, and their relationship with 140 aligned concepts of better governance such as accountability and transparency. This is 141 particularly relevant to the workings of scientific advisory committees. The way in which 142 PNS aims are reflected in policy discourse related to the workings of scientific advisory 143 bodies will be examined below. 144
Policy rationales for the extended peer community in the operations of SABs 145
Scientific Advisory Committees are seen as "boundary organisations" working at the 146 interface between science, policy and society (Guston, 2001 ), which makes them clear 147 contenders for the post normal scientific practice. Historically, however, they have been 148 tasked with risk assessment, that is the technical decision making of experts who engage in 149 systematic, analytical, and largely probabilistic thinking to characterise hazard, model its 150 distribution, and estimate its risk (Renn, 1998) 
procedures. 177

Aim of the paper 178
The aim of the current paper is to examine the application of PNS in practice through 179 a study of the Scientific Advisory Committee for Nutrition (SACN). We use the theoretical 180 insights from PNS-related studies to structure the analysis and examine the way in which 181 PNS aims resonate with the practices of the boundary organization such as SACN. We have 182 selected a particular case of SACN recommendations for salt, the scientific area that is 183 characterized by controversy, uncertainty, vested interests and conflict, and can therefore 184 be described as a "wicked problem". We apply the frame of PNS through documentary 185 analysis.
The Case of SACN UK and the Analytical Framework 187
The Table 1 for details) that will 222 form the basis of our research. 223
Analytical Framework 224
To address whether and to what extent the practice of post-normal science is evident in 225 the workings of SACN, we have identified themes to develop a coding system, which was 226 guided on the one hand by the existing literature, and on the other, through inductive 227 analysis of the data. We found the analytical framework summarized and applied by 228 • Influence of knowledge: How were the comments of the extended peer community 250 incorporated into the final report? Whose comments were addressed, and how? 251
All publicly available documents related to the workings of the SSG were identified, 252 which included 5 reports on the minutes of meetings of the SSG (the final one of 253 which included the Subgroup's response to consultation), a table summarisingsubmitters' comments, the draft report, and the final Salt and Health reports (see 255 Salt recommendations setting by the SACN UK was set against the backdrop of a 263 long running, acerbic dispute in nutrition and medicine over the putative risks and benefits 264 of the nutrient. When the SACN SSG was established to review the evidence on salt, the salt 265 controversy had been in its full swing, fuelled by a number of scientific uncertainties, value 266 conflicts and vested interests. The key aspect of the debate is whether a drop of blood 267 pressure by 1 or 2 millimeters of mercury due to reduction in salt is a sufficient basis for a 268 prolonged, expensive public health campaign. It is argued that at the individual level, its 269 effect upon hypertension is considerably smaller than that of drugs, and at the population 270 level, though significant for the hypertensive, the effect of salt reduction is in fact 271 insignificant for the majority of the population with normal blood pressure (Swales, 1988; 272 2000) . The existence of the controversy is often attributed to the powerful interests and 273 lobby groups of food processing industry, who are seen as the principal culprit of the 274 current intake of salt, most of which is through processed food (Godlee, 1996; McGregor, 275 1997) . about the mounting scientific evidence that salt increases blood pressure, and the 292 recognition that most dietary salt (65-85%) is sourced from processed foods. Indeed, food 293 manufacturers had actively sought to engage with government's policy on salt with an aim 294 of minimizing the potentially negative effect upon industry (Godlee, 1996) . In recognition of 295 this, the SSG included three independent experts with academic backgrounds in human 296 nutrition and epidemiology and a representative of industry. There were six observers from 297 the Department of Health and the Food Standards Agency. 298
The SSG's proceedings began with collation of responses from interested parties. 299
Responses were received from 11 organisations, all but two of whom were private 300 corporate organisations and their representatives. The nature of these submissions by the 301 interested parties was twofold: to contribute to the development of the frame for sourcing 302 and interpreting evidence and to suggest new evidence for consideration, published since 303 the last salt recommendations by COMA. Many submissions requested careful 304 considerations of risks of salt reduction, of reliability of measurements, the range of health 305 outcomes, the nature of studies (how able are they to capture "habitual" intake). As a result 306 of this exercise, the SSG drafted statements which provided an important frame for the 307 further sourcing and interpretation of evidence in terms of: 1) importance of sodium and 308 understanding physiological requirements for sodium; 2) relative importance of chloride 309 ion; 3) need to understand salt sensitivity; 4) need to clarify morbidity and mortality 310
outcomes. 311
Participation 312
Following a series of the SSG's meetings, a draft report was placed on the SACN 313 website in September 2002 for consultation (please see Table 1 for the summary of the 314 Draft Report conclusions). After a 3 month consultation period, stakeholder submissions to 315 the draft report on Salt and Health were collated, and the SSG issued a response on 7 316 In total 28 responses to the draft report were received, and the extended peer 319 community included 10 corporate sector organisations, 8 NGOs, 7 professional or academic 320 institutions, and 3 individual submitters. 321
-Please Insert Text Box 1-322
Of the total number of respondents, 15 were in agreement with the conclusions, 2 324 agreed with parts of the report, 4 respondents raised points but did not comment on the 325 conclusions, and 7 did not agree with its conclusions. Organisations that were not 326 supportive of the draft report were six corporate organisations and one individual. 
The extended peer community's comments about the framing of the issue 334
A considerable number of comments related to the way in which the SSG conducted the 335 review. One of the key issues that emerged from submitters' comments concerned the way 336 the SSG framed the problem. Many questioned the health end-points taken into 337 consideration, for instance a specific medical indicator of health such as blood pressure or a 338 health outcome such as cardiovascular disease or mortality. Some stakeholders felt that the 339 problem under consideration was framed in terms of risk of excessive intake, whilst it was 340 felt that broadening this to include the risk of sodium deficiency would lead to substantively 341 different conclusions. Many submitters requested broadening the scope of the review to 342 include the role of other factors in hypertension. Others commented on the way in which 343 certain concepts were defined and how this influenced the sourcing of evidence. For 344 instance, comments were received about the lack of clarity about the choice of age bands 345 for children, as well as the reasoning behind the decision not to separate recommendationsfor men and women. The majority of comments around the framing of the problem were 347 submitted by those representing the corporate sector. 348
A large number of comments addressed a perceived lack of transparency in the 349 rationales for setting the boundaries of the problem frame. The respondents appeared to be 350 unclear about the inclusion/exclusion criteria for the studies selected. There were also more 351 general accusations of bias, lack of accuracy in interpreting the data and lack of clarity and 352 consistency in reporting. 353
One submitter questioned the legitimacy of the subgroup, querying the 354 appropriateness of the current range of expertise selected to address the issue as 355 framed by the Subgroup's terms of reference. 356
The extended peer community's comments about the evidence 357
A wide range of comments related to the way evidence was gathered, selected, and 358
interpreted. There was considerable disagreement about the degree to which the list of the 359 studies selected for inclusion was exhaustive: whilst some respondents felt that the breadth 360 of studies from which evidence was drawn was too wide (e.g., animal studies), others felt it 361 was partial (e.g., individual trials included, but few systematic reviews). It was also felt that 362 the selection of the studies favoured short-term physiological effects over the long term 363 impact of salt consumption on health. Some responses requested the broadening of the 364 range of studies to include consideration of other factors influencing hypertension, rather 365 than just salt consumption. A related point addressed the quality of evidence and 366 commented on the inclusion of outdated studies in the review. Finally, a host of submissions 367 centred on the Subgroup's interpretation of the evidence presented and how the 368 conclusions were drawn. Some submitters commented on the lack of an explicit account of 369 what approach was used to evaluate evidence. It was felt that too much weight was given 370 to some studies, that the choice of terms to describe the new evidence (since the last COMA 371 report) should be characterised as 'more numerous' rather than 'stronger', and that the 372 potential dangers of sodium restriction had been ignored. 373
The extended peer community's comments about the SSG's decision 374
The final recommendations for daily intake of sodium and how these were to be 375 implemented attracted a range of respondents' comments. Many submitters felt that the 376 evidence reviewed failed to warrant the final conclusions reached by the SSG. 377
The extent of stakeholder disagreement was further apparent in the diverse 378 assessments of whether the Subgroup's recommendations of 6g of salt per day was above 379 or below the levels suggested by the reviewed evidence. For instance, an NGO queried why, 380 despite the body of scientific evidence suggesting that 4g of salt per day should be the 381 recommended dose, the current recommendation of 6g of salt a day was endorsed. On the 382 other hand, a corporate sector submission characterised the target levels set for children as 383 unrealistically low and unachievable, suggesting it could potentially deter consumption of 384 foods of nutritional importance for children such as cheese and milk. One comment raised 385 the expectation that the final recommendation must be in line with the internationally 386 accepted values for salt, quoting the WHO's recommended 5g of salt a day. A separate, 387 though related point was the way in which the population group of interest was defined and 388 conclusions generalised to the whole adult population. 389
The challenges of translating the recommendations into policy, and the 390 viability of possible implementation strategies were key concerns for many 391 submitters. In particular, how the recommendation would be legislated around foodlabelling, whether implementation necessitated considerations of issues of food 393 safety (e.g., the use of salt as a preservative), and what specific measures would be 394 taken to achieve the target (e.g., how to marry up advice regarding processed food 395 and discretionary consumer use of salt) were questions posed by a number of 396 respondents. Some submitters felt that this was an opportunity to query the 397 research commissioning process and the direction of further research. 398
How influential was the extended peer community? 399
The SSG produced a 'response to the stakeholder submissions' document on 7 400 around the issues of transparency and clarity of presentation, and for the most part, the SSG 403 accepted criticism and agreed to amend the draft document to achieve greater clarity. Thus, 404 for instance, the SSG agreed to provide a clear rationale for the evaluation of evidence and a 405 rationale for why the report advocated a population-based approach. They also agreed to 406 make editing changes to the document, including reiterating certain issues (e.g., future 407 research) in the Conclusion section and amending wording in the text (e.g., from 'stronger 408 evidence' to 'larger body of evidence'). The concern raised around the legitimacy of the SSG 409 in relation to the range of expertise within the SSG was rejected, though this decision was 410 not elaborated. 411
The issue that generated the most controversy and debate related to the selection 412 criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of evidence for consideration. The committee chose 413 selectively which comments pertinent to the selection and breadth of evidence to accept. 414
Thus, for instance, the committee agreed to extend the review by widening the range oflonger-term and meta-analytic studies included in the review as well as more recent dietary 416 exposure surveys. The criticism suggesting that the SSG's report gave disproportionate 417 consideration to the animal studies was rejected, and justified as largely being pre-418 determined by the terms of reference and the framing of the problem. Indeed, one of the 419 key arguments justifying the selection criteria centred on what was thought to be restrictive 420 terms of reference (or problem framing) for the workings of the SSG. However, our reading 421 of the SSG's responses suggests that the Subgroup in fact had some autonomy in how the 422 problem was framed. Thus, in response to the request for an inclusion of other factors 423 affecting hypertension in conjunction with salt (in order to provide a balanced review of the 424 role of salt in health), the SSG emphasised some factors (e.g. physical activity and lifestyle), 425
to the exclusion of others (e.g., genes). The basis for such prioritisation was not always 426 made explicit.. 427
The final recommendation that sodium intake was not to exceed 6g was reflective 428 of the SSG's judgments about the possibilities of achieving behaviour change in line with the 429 recommendations, in the context of the large behavioural shifts required to move from the 430 current 9g of average intake to the requirements of no more than 4g. Although this 431 decision was based on pragmatic considerations, the whole section of submitter comments 432 focusing upon implementation of recommendations was rejected as being beyond the SSG's 433 scope of providing recommendations based on risk assessment. 434
Before the revised report could be agreed on, the SSG sought the advice of another 435 SACN subgroup, the Subgroup on Maternal and Child Nutrition (SMCN). A more specialist 436 opinion was needed from experts on the adequacy of findings in children and infants. On 15 437 the broader sets of values and interests). Despite adopting what is ostensibly PNS practice, 508 however, the SSG appeared to be set on distancing itself from the demonstrable pressures 509 of different interest groups through the repeated reference to the "objectivity" of risk 510 assessment. This is particularly poignant in the light of the submissions analysed here which 511 came mainly from the organisations with narrow specialisms (linked with nutrition and 512 medical conditions associated with over consumption of salt), or vested interests (corporate 513 sector, NGOs active in the area of nutrition). Very few submissions came from individual 514 members of the public, and none were submitted from representatives of the target 515 population as defined by the terms of reference (e.g., children). Thus, the submissions were 516 far from representative of the broad cross-section of perspectives and views. This raises a 517 practical question relevant to boundary organisations such as the SACN SSG about how the 518 aims of PNS are to be achieved in the context of the simultaneous policy imperative of 519 scientific independence from the vested interests. 520
What we have witnessed through this analysis is therefore a curious contradiction 521 between the engagement of a SAB with the extended peer community on one hand, and 522 the simultaneous distancing from the consequences of such engagement through re-523 assertion of scientific authority. Viewed in such light, the engagement with stakeholders on 524 behalf of the SACN can be construed as a political act -to gain credibility and acceptance 525 through PNS practice, whilst maintaining legitimacy as an independent body by deflecting 526 the influence of controversial values and vested interests upon the decision outcomes. 527
We can find theoretical resonance of this finding with the recently proposed concept 528 of risk colonisation (Rothstein, 2004; Rothstein, 2006 a,b ). The concept has been put forward 529 to explain the way in which an increased emphasis upon risk assessment in regulation hasacted to amplify institutional risks (risks to the institution's legitimacy, credibility and 531 accountability) thus threatening institutions' organisation and practices. The emphasis upon 532 "good governance" that requires an organisation's greater transparency and openness, 533 consultation as well as constant accounting for their practices (to the wider audiences with 534 often conflicting judgment criteria) has given rise to the practice of managing "institutional 535 risks". This creates a dual role for governing organisations: to govern societal risks whilst 536 simultaneously managing their own institutional risks.
As the current analysis 537 demonstrates, the SACN consultation process is as much a process of engaging in optimal 538 risk assessment, as a way of managing sources of risk to its organisation. Thus, rather than 539 being evidence of post normal scientific practice, the engagement became a mechanism for 540 confirming the specific scientific practice that is resonant with technocratic models of 541 science as "holding authority over the facts". 542
Examined in the context of a case study of the SSG consultation we can see the value 543 of PNS as a normative framework though less support for its role as a theoretical model in 544 explaining new modes of science practice. This may be partly due to the specific nature of 545 our case of micronutrient recommendations which, though uncertain, complex, and often 546 controversial and disputed, is nevertheless characterised by a degree of consensus about its 547 overarching aim -to help achieve healthy population (Dhonukshe-Rutten et al, 2010). 548
Scientists within scientific advisory committees for nutrition may see their role as the 549 "guardians of public health", their values aligned with those of the public and in conflict 550 with food industry, and hence their science as a "quest for truth" rather than "quality 551 control". The evaluation of the extent to which the adoption of PNS aims in practice by SABs 552 is the function of the nature of and interactions between the value networks clustered 553 around an issue might provide useful insights into the applicability and limitations of PNS. 
